

**తొలి త్రైమాసికంలో 10.50 శాతంగా రాష్ట్ర వృద్ధి రేటు: జాతీయ సగటు 8.8 శాతాన్ని అధిగమించిన ఏపీ ప్రగతి రెండంకెల వృద్ధిపై సీఎం చంద్రబాబు సంతృప్తి: పరిశ్రమల రంగంలో అత్యధికంగా 11.91 శాతం పెరుగుదల పూర్తి ఆర్థిక సంవత్సరానికి 17.1 శాతం వృద్ధి లక్ష్యం: రూ.3.57 లక్షల కోట్లకు చేరిన రాష్ట్ర స్థూల విలువ జోడింపు**

పెంపకం-ఆకాశకల్పర్ రూ.32,110 కోట్లు (14.52% వృద్ధి), మాంసం ఉత్పత్తి 3.15 లక్షల మెట్రిక్ టన్నుల నుంచి 3.41 లక్షల మెట్రిక్ టన్నులకు పెరిగింది (8% వృద్ధి), గడ్డ ఉత్పత్తి 62,157 లక్షల నుంచి 67,450 లక్షలకు పెరిగింది.వరిశ్రమల రంగం: మైసోర్-కార్నాయింగోల్ రూ.10,686 కోట్లు (43.54% వృద్ధి), తయారీ రంగం రూ.40,515 కోట్లు (9.93% వృద్ధి), నిర్మాణ రంగం రూ.31,550 కోట్లు (9.57% వృద్ధి), రోడ్ మెటల్, బ్లాక్ గ్రానైట్, కలర్ గ్రానైట్ ఉత్పత్తి పెరిగింది.సేవా రంగం: హెల్సుబళ్లు, రవాణా - పర్యాటక రంగం రూ.25,702 కోట్లు (17.92% వృద్ధి), రియల్ ఎస్టేట్ - ప్రాజెక్టుల నర్వీసులు రూ.34,324 కోట్లు (11.70% వృద్ధి), పర్యాటకులు 6.89 కోట్లు నుంచి 8.07 కోట్లకు పెరిగారు (17.08% వృద్ధి), విమాన ప్రయాణికులు 13.09 లక్షల నుంచి 15.85 లక్షలకు పెరిగారు (21.1% వృద్ధి).

**ఆపరేషన్ సింధూర్ వేక..**  
**400 మంది కొత్త శాస్త్రవేత్తల సేవలు!**

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స్వాధీని: ఆవరేషన్ సిందూర్ సమయంలో 400 మంది శాస్త్రవేత్తలు నిరంతరం పనిచేసినట్లు భారత అంతరిక్ష పరిశోధన సంస్థ చైర్మన్ వీ నారాయణన్ వెల్లడించారు. ఎర్త్ ఆబ్జర్వేషన్, కమ్యూనికేషన్ శాటిలైట్ల పనితీరును పరీక్షిస్తూ.. జాతీయ భద్రత అవసరాలకు అనుగుణంగా ఉపగ్రహాల సమాచారాన్ని అందించినట్లు చెప్పారు. దీల్లో జరిగిన ఆల్ ఇండియా మేనేజ్మెంట్ ఆఫోసియేషన్ 52వ జాతీయ మేనేజ్మెంట్ కన్ఫరెన్స్లో ప్రసంగించి ఈ విషయాన్ని వెల్లడించారు. “ఆవరేషన్ సిందూర్ సమయంలో అన్ని శాస్త్రవేత్తలు నిరంతరం కచ్చితత్వంతో పనిచేశారు. అవసరమైన సమాచారాన్ని అందించాయి. 400లకు పైగా శాస్త్రవేత్తలు 24%భాగం, పూర్తి సమయం పనిచేశారు. భూ పరిశీలన, కమ్యూనికేషన్లకు సంబంధించిన ఉపగ్రహాలన్నీ సంపూర్ణ సేవలందించాయి” అని పేర్కొన్నారు. గగనయాన్ ప్రాజెక్టులో భాగంగా ఇప్పటివరకు 7700 క్షేత్రస్థాయి పరీక్షలు పూర్తిచేశామన్నారు. మరో 2300 పరీక్షలు చేసేందుకు ప్రణాళికలు నిర్ధం చేశామని చెప్పారు. జాతీయ భద్రత, సరిహద్దు సంక్షోభం వంటి సమయంలో అంతరిక్ష రంగం కీలకంగా చ్యవహరిస్తుందన్న విషయం ఆవరేషన్ సిందూర్ సమయంలో మరోసారి స్పష్టమైన విషయం తెలిసిందే. ఆ సమయంలో సామగ్రిని డ్రోప్, మందుగుండు సామగ్రి ఛార్జి స్థాయిలో వినియోగించడం, దేశీయంగా అభివృద్ధి చేసిన ఆకాశతీర్ పంది రక్షణ వ్యవస్థ సామర్థ్యాలును పరీక్షించడంలోనూ ఇలానే ప్రముఖ పాత్ర పోషిస్తోంది. ఇందుకు సంబంధించి ఆయా శాఖలలో పనిచేస్తోంది.







వినియోగించుకోవడంపై వారికి దిశానిర్దేశం చేశారు. అఖిల భారత కాంగ్రెస్ కమిటీ నిర్వహించిన సమావేశం వివరాలను వారికి తెలియజేశారు. ఎక్కువగా క్రాస్ ఓటింగ్ ఉండబోవడం ఈ సందర్భంగా రేపంత్ రెడ్డి.. పార్టీ అధిష్ఠానానికి భరోసా సైం ఇవ్వారు.మల్లు రవి, చామల కిరణ్ కుమార్ రెడ్డి, రేణుక వాడరి, అనిల్ కుమార్ యాదవ్, జీ పంఠి, డాక్టర్ కడియం కావ్య, కేంద్ర మాజీ మంత్రి బలరాం యాదవ్, కుందూరు రఘువీర, రఘురాం రెడ్డి, సురేష్ షెట్టార్ పాల్గొన్నారు. ఈ ఎన్నికల్లో ఇండియా బ్లాక్ తరఫున బరిలోకి దిగిన తెలంగాణకు చెందిన జస్టిస్ బీ సుదర్శన్ రెడ్డిని గెలిపించుకోవాలని అవసరం ఉందని రేపంత్ రెడ్డి అన్నారు. రాజకీయాలకు అతీంగా ఓటింగ్ జరగాలని వెల్లారు.

తింటే అనారోగ్య సమస్యలు కూడా వచ్చే అవకాశం ఉంటుంది. జీడిపప్పును ఎక్కువగా తినే వారిలో కడుపుబ్బరం, బరువు పెరగడం, మలబద్ధకం వంటి సమస్యలు వచ్చే ప్రమాదం ఉంటుంది .కనుక, కొలెస్ట్రాల్ సమస్యతో బాధపడేవారు జీడిపప్పును మితంగా తీసుకుంటే మంచిది .కొద్ది మొత్తంలో జీడిపప్పును చేసుకోవడం వల్ల జీడిపప్పులో ఉండే పోషక విలువ మన శరీర ఆరోగ్యానికి అవసరం చేస్తాయి. జీడిపప్పు మన శరీరానికి కావలసిన శక్తిని ఇస్తుంది. జీడిపప్పుతో ఎముకలకు బలం చేకూరుతుంది. రోగనిరోధక శక్తి పెరుగుతుంది. కండరాల, నరాల పనితీరు మెరుగుపడుతుంది.అలాకాకుండా క్యాలరీలు, కొవ్వులు అధికంగా ఉండే జీడిపప్పును ఎక్కువ మొత్తంలో తీసుకుంటే అది బరువు పెరగడానికి, కొలెస్ట్రాల్ పెరగడానికి దోహదం చేస్తుంది. కనుక జీడిపప్పు తినే విధంగానే జాగ్రత్త. మితంగా జీడిపప్పు తింటే పరార్లేదు కానీ అతిగా జీడిపప్పు తింటే అనర్ధాల్లే. అందుకే జాగ్రత్త!



pruning schedules are followed. Schools and colleges can serve as demonstration sites, teaching students about biodiversity and showing how health-friendly greenery can be integrated into urban life. Corporate Social Responsibility funding presents another powerful opportunity. Companies can invest in biodiversity parks, vertical gardens, or roadside green belts, contributing not just to environmental sustainability but also to measurable improvements in public health. Aligning corporate initiatives with citizen well-being enhances both community trust and ecological impact. The challenge is made more urgent by climate change. Rising temperatures are lengthening pollen seasons, while erratic weather patterns worsen air pollution. This calls for climate-smart landscaping — choosing drought- and heat-resistant native species, expanding rooftop greenery to counter heat islands, and aligning green interventions with broader resilience programmes such as the National Clean Air Programme and the Smart Cities Mission. Adopting a “One Health” approach that links human health, ecological balance, and climate action is no longer optional. It is the only way to ensure that urban greenery strengthens, rather than undermines, the health of citizens. Ultimately, India’s cities need greenery, but not at the expense of public well-being. Poorly chosen species and inadequate maintenance make life harder for those already vulnerable to pollution and climate stress. On the other hand, thoughtful species selection, biodiversity, balanced planting, and scientific upkeep can transform urban greenery into a form of ecological medicine. As India urbanises rapidly, the true test of urban greening should not be how many saplings are planted, but how many citizens — especially children and the

premieres alone cannot buy. It anchors India in film history while feeding new audiences into contemporary releases. At the same time, transnational production is the norm, not the exception. From India-France-Sri Lanka collaborations in Busan Competition to India-backed projects at APM and the global producing constellation around Indian directors at TIFF, India's creative economy is fluent in co-production. This reframes 'Indian cinema' as an international network rather than a single-country pipeline. Finally, the diaspora multiplier is real. TIFF's record 17 South Asian titles illustrate how stories with Indian DNA travel across borders and audience segments. Diaspora visibility reduces market risk for distributors while keeping the centre of gravity tied to Indian creative labour and themes. That is soft power with a revenue model. In the near term, all eyes are on the TIFF premieres of *Homebound*, *Bandar*, and *Bayaan* to see how critics and buyers position them in awards-season lanes; on the TIFF Classics reception for *Sholay* as a temperature check on canonical Indian cinema for North American audiences; and on Busan's Vision-Asia titles and APM deals for signals on which Indian filmmakers are about to graduate from development to global distribution. If you map this across two cycles, Venice/Busan this autumn, Berlin/Cannes next spring, you will see Indian cinema's presence now behaves like a rhythm, not a spike. The broader meaning is simple: India's creative engine is diversifying and professionalising fast, and the world's most competitive festival ecosystems are responding in kind. Heritage is being curated with care; new films are premiering on the biggest stages; and projects are being incubated in the right markets. That is how a country steps from "arriving" to "arrived."



# Theatrisation Debate Re-Ignited

Theatrisation is a much-needed organisational reform to ensure that military-economy-technology develops as a triad to render a powerful nation. The long smouldering ember of theatrisation burst into a ball of fire at a fireside chat at the Army War College recently. Chief of Air Staff (CAS) questioned the need for a joint structure, putting the clock back by a few years. In the same conversation, he acknowledged the smooth conduct of Operation (Op) SINDOOR, with four of them planning together. This was a welcome change from 1999, when the Indian Army and Indian Air Force conducted two distinct operations, namely Op VIJAY and Op SAFED SAGAR, respectively. So credible was the integration in Op SINDOOR that until the Air Chief himself revealed it in a speech, most Indians did not know that five of the seven targets hit on 7th May were by the Army and only two by the Air Force. That subsequent retaliation by Pakistan and coup de grâce on 10th May could be handled equally smoothly is reason enough to believe that the current structures did deliver. Readers should know that the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was opposed by the IAF equally, if not more, vehemently. This author had a ringside view of all discussions while recording minutes of each meeting of the “Task Force on Management of Defence (TFMD),” headed by Shri Arun Singh, whose recommendations were entirely accepted and subsumed into the Report by the GoM on Security headed by Shri LK Advani and comprising other members of CCS. The task force comprised 11 members — one scientist, four serving bureaucrats, four serving military officers (including the Director General, Defence Planning Staff as the member secretary) and one retired service officer, besides the chairman. All serving officers were additional secretary or of equivalent status. There was complete consensus on every recommendation except the CDS. The final recommendation on CDS was decided through a vote, with numbers mentioned in the report. However, despite the GoM recommendations, CDS appointment took two decades to fructify, perhaps stymied by the objections of not just bureaucrats but also the IAF. In the absence of the CDS, the remaining structure did not quite evolve the way it should have. A common lament in Service HQ is that the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) just added another layer in decision-making between Service HQ and MoD. CAS, from what is available in the public domain, has flagged two concerns — additional layers in decision-making and lack of resources for dedicated allocation to theatres. As it stands, resources within the Indian Air Force (IAF) are distributed among commands. That does not inhibit concentrated force application when required. The fears regarding decision-making layers perhaps arise not only from the IDS experience, but also from the undefined equation among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS. CDS, as the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the principal military adviser to Raksha Mantri (RM), does enjoy the status of the primus inter pares. However, he does not have an operational mandate over Service HQ. The role of CDS, as envisaged in GoM recommendations, was to integrate planning and budgeting functions for credible perspective planning and necessary force development through optimal utilisation of defence budget. Less than expected results in these objectives does generate apprehensions about unsettling the operational structure. Any discussion on theatre commands must be based on credible operational logic. Agni-Veer is a case in point, where the narrative of saving in pension smothered the logic of a youthful, skilled and motivated force that the Agni-Veer scheme begets. Jointmanship has a logic, just as three different services for land, sea and air do. New domains of space and cyberspace have since evolved, but without a separate service being raised for them. Back in 1941, Panzer divisions were halted short of Dunkirk for air campaign to progress the war in Western Europe. Fifty years later, air and land battles merged seamlessly in Op DESERT STORM. Five weeks of air campaign were as crucial to victory as 100 hours of land campaign. But the most critical was their joint orchestration. We’re three decades down the road from Op DESERT STORM. Jointmanship exists more in words than in thoughts and deeds. Where is a modern war fought? What does it target? Where is the victory achieved? It is necessary to discuss such questions to bring out the nuances of physical, informational, perceptual and metaphysical dimensions of modern war, and

to appreciate the need for joint orchestration of every military asset. War is but an instrument for prevailing of one national will over another, where every element of national power, whether military, economic, informational or diplomatic, is brought to bear its impact. Military acts exclusively in the physical dimension of war. Higher dimensions, where the whole of the nation gets involved, only count impact, oblivious of domain boundaries. Further, tactical impacts are fleeting and waning and, hence, need synergy in time and space. Individual service characteristics, such as speed, lethality, accuracy, knowledge of target, logistic footprint, survivability and resilience, particularly in face of retaliation, fuse into spatio-temporal orchestration. This is the logic of the unitary command structure of the military that most militaries follow. This logic has no geographical basis and, thus, there is no reason for India to be an exception. Back in 2000, when the CDS was recommended, the fear was that the concentration of command in one individual would render the military vulnerable to politicisation. This legitimate fear, expressed by experienced bureaucrats, imposed caution. Civil control over the military and an apolitical military are the hallmarks of a healthy democracy. CDS without an operational role was, however, not a compromise solution, but an effort to address the priorities in defence management. The military had been far more successful in operations than in perspective planning and force development. Although inadequacies were blamed on bureaucracy, many of the problems lay within and among Service HQs. CDS was to lead integrated planning and detailed budgeting to simplify bureaucratic practices. The Kargil Review Report, authored by the redoubtable Shri K Subrahmanyam, had been scathing in its comments on the functioning of Service Headquarters. TFMD addressed both the weaknesses and fears by recommending a CDS with a planning, rather than operational role. Theatre commands were also discussed. Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) were, thus, recommended to be under the CDS for incubation as joint services command. In the absence of CDS for two decades, the structure, however, could not mature. CAS remarks against “joint structure” indicate that the structure of the theatre command being presented is less than agreeable. There is no gainsaying that an integrated grid for fire support, mobility support, information support, logistic support and protection/survivability of men and machines would render exercise of operational art in a theatre far more effective. Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) is as much about decisions as about actions. Initiative and momentum go hand in hand. Loss of one results in loss of the other. Moreover, since wrong moves lead to loss of initiative, decisions ought to be as correct as speedy. Right decisions are based on timely and comprehensive information for which a joint services theatre is immensely more suitable. CAS also brought up the need for experience in certain skill sets for higher leadership. This argument is specious. IAF has had a Chief who was not a fighter pilot. Higher leadership is about comprehension, perspectives and visualisation. Perspectives are gained more by exposure than experience. While intellect and exposure build upon each other to develop perspectives, mere experience may result in biases. An Air Force officer can make as good a theatre commander as an Army or a Navy officer. A structure evolved through consensus not only gets implemented more credibly, but is also far more sustaining. No written document on reforms is comprehensive. However, when the logic of change is understood and accepted, the gaps are credibly filled and coherence in reforms is maintained. It is, therefore, essential that the structure of joint services theatre and relationship among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS be thoroughly discussed and arrived at with willing consensus. As in humans, so in organisations, health at birth is critical to a healthy life ahead. Theatrisation is a much-needed organisational reform to ensure that military-economy-technology develops as a triad to render a powerful nation. The need to discuss till consensus cannot be overemphasised. The long smouldering ember of theatrisation burst into a ball of fire at a fireside chat at the Army War College recently. Chief of Air Staff (CAS) questioned the need for a joint structure, putting the clock back by a few years. In the same conversation, he acknowledged the smooth conduct of Operation (Op) SINDOOR, with four of them planning together.



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